[The Question Raised by the Chongqing Landslide… “The Era of Mega-Infrastructure is Over”]

As a series of large landslides and aging dam collapses hit China this summer, safety debates surrounding the Three Gorges Dam (三峡大坝), the world's largest hydroelectric facility, are resurfacing. These recent disasters are not directly linked to the Three Gorges Dam itself. However, the recurring accidents are seen as a symbolic signal that the mega-water conservancy infrastructure, constructed through concentrated national effort over the past few decades, is facing a new test. In particular, as the maintenance and management of large dams and reservoirs emerge as a fresh social challenge amid extreme flood and drought cycles caused by climate change, the Three Gorges Dam—long touted as a symbol of Chinese modernization—has again returned to the center of controversy. The starting point of this debate was a massive landslide that occurred on July 17 in Pengshui County, Chongqing Municipality, China.

On the early morning of July 17 at 4:00 AM, a massive landslide struck Pengshui County, Chongqing. Residents had sensed abnormal signs on the mountain since early morning, but the critical moment arrived at 9:08 AM. A local grid management worker on patrol noticed falling rocks on the hillside and immediately reported the danger. Evacuation began, and before it was completed, the entire mountain slope collapsed.

The Pengshui county government stated in an emergency briefing, "Thanks to the grid manager's swift report, around 60 residents in the high-risk collapse zone were evacuated beforehand, and over 1,100 people in total were urgently evacuated." Nevertheless, 8 people were killed and 34 went missing.

According to local official announcements, the scale of the collapse reached approximately 60 meters in length, 30 meters in height, and about 18,000 cubic meters of earth and rock. A risk of a second collapse remains, prompting ongoing radar and 24-hour monitoring operations.

[An Aging Dam Collapsed Just Ten Days Prior]

The landslide drew even greater attention because another major disaster had struck just ten days earlier. On July 6, torrential rains brought by a typhoon caused two breaches in the dyke of the Liulan Reservoir (六蓝水库), built in 1958, in Hengzhou City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The breached dyke section alone spanned about 50 meters, affecting approximately 55,000 residents and forcing 48,000 into emergency evacuation. Local residents described the situation, saying, "It's the first time in 50 to 60 years we've seen a dam breach like this."

Granted, the two incidents were caused by different factors. One was a landslide, and the other was a collapse due to an aging reservoir embankment failing to withstand heavy rain. Drawing a direct connection between the two is an overreach. However, both disasters caused considerable shock across Chinese society because they shared a common thread: the intersection of extreme weather events and aging infrastructure.

Indeed, according to Ministry of Water Resources data, an average of 71 dams collapsed annually in China over the 50-year period from 1954 to 2003. Most were small-scale reservoirs, making simple comparisons with today's management standards difficult. Nevertheless, these statistics are significant as an indicator that a substantial portion of China's water infrastructure, heavily built during the 1950s through 1970s, has now entered the phase of aging. Compounded by record-breaking floods and droughts driven by recent climate change, the burden of maintaining and managing existing infrastructure is growing heavier. The ultimate target of this debate inevitably points to the world's largest hydroelectric power facility: the Three Gorges Dam.

[The World's Largest Three Gorges Dam, and a Burden Just as Immense]

The Three Gorges Dam is drawing attention again not merely because of its size as the world's largest. It represents the largest national project pursued by China since its reform and opening-up policy and serves as a flagship model of state-led development. Built to simultaneously achieve three goals—power generation, flood control, and inland logistics innovation—China has long promoted it as a "monumental achievement of socialist modernization."

Construction began in 1994, the main structure was completed in 2006, and the entire project concluded in 2009. Measuring 2,335 meters long, 185 meters high, and possessing a total storage capacity of 39.3 billion cubic meters, it is the world's largest hydroelectric generation facility. The reservoir stretches roughly 660 km along the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, playing a key role in the Chinese economy not only through power production but also through flood control and navigation improvements.

In fact, navigation routes along the upper Yangtze River changed dramatically after the dam's construction. Sections that previously accommodated only 1,000-ton vessels can now handle 3,000 to 5,000-ton ships, significantly lowering inland logistics costs. Large-scale hydroelectric generation has also contributed to stabilizing China's power supply. Based on these achievements alone, the Three Gorges Dam is undoubtedly a landmark national project China can take pride in on the global stage.

However, mega-infrastructure incurs a new challenge the moment it is completed: maintenance and operations. Since initial impoundment testing began in 2003, various unexpected issues have consistently been raised. Prominent among them are landslides and ground stability around the reservoir. Because large reservoirs cause repeated water level fluctuations that impact surrounding slopes, landslide and collapse risk zones near the Three Gorges Dam have been continuously reported following impoundment. The Chinese government has continually pursued reinforcement work in high-risk areas and resident relocation.

That said, it is difficult to attribute all landslides solely to the Three Gorges Dam. While some overseas researchers emphasize a link to water impoundment, the Chinese government and parts of academia explain that it is the combined result of inherently fragile local geology and natural conditions such as heavy rains. In short, while the occurrence of landslides is a confirmed fact, interpretations regarding their root causes remain a matter of ongoing debate.

Another point of contention is sedimentation. Concerns were raised even before construction that vast amounts of sediment flowing from the upper Yangtze River would deposit in the reservoir, burdening storage capacity and navigation routes over the long term. China explains that it manages this through discharge pattern adjustments and dredging, but many project that maintenance costs will continue to rise over time. Conversely, some studies suggest the issue is not as severe as initial fears suggested. Ultimately, sedimentation is neither a "non-existent issue" nor a "fatal threat to the dam's survival," but rather an objective challenge requiring continuous management.

Facility aging will also be a key variable moving forward. While some overseas researchers have raised ongoing concerns regarding concrete cracking and bedrock water seepage, specific details have not all been officially verified. However, nearly 20 years after completion, there is little dispute that the facility has entered a phase where large-scale repairs and long-term maintenance are essential.

[Why Spend 15 Trillion Won to Build Another Ship Lock?]

This reality is reflected in a recent decision by the Chinese government. In June, China began construction on the 'Three Gorges Waterway New Passage' in Yichang, Hubei Province. The total project cost stands at approximately 77.2 billion yuan (around 15 trillion KRW). Built north of the existing ship lock, the new lock is expected to greatly expand annual shipping capacity upon completion.

The official reason is the increase in freight volume. However, looking at the background, the existing facilities have already exceeded the processing capacity anticipated during design. The Three Gorges ship lock was originally designed for an annual cargo volume of around 100 million tons, a figure surpassed as early as 2011, reaching roughly 173 million tons of cargo by 2025. Reports have emerged of ships waiting several days—or over 200 hours in extreme cases—to pass through the lock.

Consequently, a cycle is repeating where a bottleneck created by one mega-project is solved by launching another mega-project. This does not mean the Three Gorges Dam has failed. Rather, it demonstrates that over time, mega-infrastructure demands far more costs and investment in maintenance and functional expansion than in its initial construction.

This is precisely the challenge China faces. Having succeeded in building the world's largest dam, the new test lies in how safely and efficiently it can operate that giant facility over the coming decades.

[Huang Wanli's Warning, and How Much of the '12 Prophecies' Holds True]

Whenever the Three Gorges Dam debate resurfaces, one figure inevitably appears: the late Professor Huang Wanli (黄万里) of Tsinghua University, a renowned hydrologist. During the planning stages of the dam, he opposed its construction due to concerns over sedimentation, ecological disruption, and landslide risks, sending multiple open letters to the leadership.

Today across Chinese-language internet forums, claims persistently circulate that most of "Huang Wanli's 12 Prophecies" have come true. However, it is necessary to distinguish between fact and opinion. While some of the issues raised by Huang Wanli remain active research topics in academia, the claim that "11 out of 12 prophecies were accurate" is closer to an opinion popularized within political and social debates rather than a verified academic consensus. Within China, many view this as an exaggerated narrative.

Similarly, various scenarios surrounding the military vulnerability of the Three Gorges Dam must be approached with caution. Given its immense weight in China's power, logistics, and flood control systems, foreign security experts do occasionally discuss it as a strategic target. However, damage scale projections or attack simulations circulating online are mostly theoretical analyses that should be distinguished from objectively verified facts. Ultimately, what matters in the Three Gorges Dam debate is not sensationalist "collapse theories," but the pragmatic question of how to manage mega-infrastructure over several decades.

[Why Times Insight]

The recent Chongqing landslide and the aging dam collapse in Guangxi do not indicate immediate safety failures at the Three Gorges Dam itself. However, both disasters signal that the massive water conservancy infrastructure built through concentrated national resources over recent decades has entered a new phase.

In the past, China's competitiveness was measured by how fast and how big it could build. Today, the core challenge has shifted to how stably it can operate existing giant infrastructure and how flexibly it can respond to a changing natural environment.

China's decision this year to launch a 15-trillion-won new lock construction project reflects this reality. It is not merely an expansion of facilities, but a symbolic case proving that mega-infrastructure demands huge maintenance costs and additional investments as time passes.

Recently, China has been experiencing alternating cycles of record floods and severe droughts. As extreme hydrological conditions that were hard to predict under past design standards become routine, not only the Three Gorges Dam but water management facilities across all of China are confronting new challenges.

Thus, the real question surrounding the Three Gorges Dam is not "Will it collapse tomorrow?" The far more critical question is whether this massive national asset can be operated safely into the future amidst the simultaneous progression of climate change and aging infrastructure.

Having succeeded in building the world's largest dam, China now stands on trial regarding how sustainably it can manage that gigantic infrastructure. Rather than signaling an impending collapse of the Three Gorges Dam, the recent string of landslides and aging dam failures are more appropriately interpreted as a sign that China's mega-state projects have transitioned past the "era of construction" and into the "era of maintenance."